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THE ISSUE
Energy is a fundamental component of the economic relationship between the European 
Union and southern Mediterranean countries, largely driven, so far, by Europe’s quest for 
oil and gas supplies. However, given the booming energy demand in southern Mediterrane-
an countries and their great solar and wind potential, regional energy cooperation should 
also strongly focus on fostering large-scale deployment of renewable energy. This would 
allow southern Mediterranean countries to meet their increasing energy demand in a more 
sustainable way, and would also have positive economic and political benefits for Europe.
POLICY CHALLENGE
Under the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, southern Mediterranean countries 
adopted post-2020 plans to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and set targets for de-
ployment of renewables. However, these commitments are largely conditional on interna-
tional climate finance support being provided. Europe could scale-up its climate financing 
in the southern Mediterranean, but this should be linked to the implementation of certain 
energy reforms in those countries. Reforms should not be aimed at transposing in southern 
Mediterranean countries the EU framework and rules, but rather at removing the main bar-
riers to the private sector’s engagement in those countries’ renewable energy sectors. This 
could be done by promoting pragmatic solutions to specific legal, regulatory and financial 
bottlenecks. Greater climate financing should be provided only when southern Mediter-
ranean countries implement such solutions in practice. Helping southern Mediterranean 
countries meet their energy needs in a sustainable way would also benefit Europe by open-
ing up new business opportunities for European energy companies, promoting the export 
of European renewable energy technologies, guaranteeing the stability of future gas exports 
from the region to Europe, promoting economic development in southern Mediterranean 
countries and delivering on those countries’ pledges under the Paris Agreement.
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1 ENERGY: THE CORE OF THE EURO-
MEDITERRANEAN ECONOMIC 
RELATIONSHIP
Energy is a fundamental component 
of the economic relationship between 
the European Union and the ‘southern 
neighbourhood’ Mediterranean coun-
tries1. This dates back to the 1960s, when 
discussions started on the first large-scale 
energy infrastructure in the Mediterrane-
an region – a gas pipeline connecting Al-
geria to Italy via Tunisia. Since then, more 
than 6,000 kilometres of gas pipelines 
have been laid across the Mediterranean, 
to connect Algeria with Spain and Italy, 
and Libya with Italy. Large-scale liquified 
natural gas (LNG) and oil infrastructure 
has also been constructed all around the 
Mediterranean2.
This infrastructure, built on the basis 
of bilateral state-to-state and company-
to-company relationships between 
producers in the south and importers 
in the north, still channels a major part 
of Southern Mediterranean countries’ 
(SMCs) total exports to Europe (Figure 1).
Figure 1: SMCs’ exports to Europe: the 
key role of energy (€ billions)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat data.
In the early 2000s, the idea emerged 
of replicating the successful gas 
cooperation story in the Mediterranean 
region in the area of renewable energy. 
Taking a regionalist approach rather 
than a traditional bilateral approach to 
cooperation, two initiatives were launched 
with the objective of tapping into the vast 
solar and wind energy potential of SMCs: 
Desertec and the Mediterranean Solar 
Plan. These would supply clean energy 
to the SMCs and to Europe. Desertec was 
a German industrial initiative, and the 
Mediterranean Solar Plan was a Union 
for the Mediterranean flagship project. 
Both initiatives were supported by the 
European Union, which has always viewed 
energy cooperation as a special tool to 
promote political stability and economic 
prosperity in the region.
But these two initiatives failed in less 
than a decade, largely because of a lack 
of commercial and political realism. The 
initiatives’ business models were based 
on the export to the EU of solar and wind 
electricity produced in SMCs and were 
not commercially viable because of: i) 
high electricity generation costs; ii) lack 
of electricity interconnections between 
SMCs and between the northern and 
southern Mediterranean shores; and 
iii) the lack of a clear need on the EU 
side for additional renewable energy 
capacity. In political terms, the initiatives 
did not properly consider that the first 
priority for SMCs was meeting their own 
booming energy demand. Nor did they 
take sufficiently into account the overall 
lack of cooperation between SMCs, the 
group of countries with the lowest level 
of intra-regional trade in the world. 
In particular, both initiatives proved 
unrealistic because they sought to adopt a 
one-size-fits-all approach to a region that 
was – and continues to be – too complex 
and diverse for this to work (Tagliapietra 
and Zachmann, 2016).
This experience suggests that fostering 
renewable energy in the region cannot 
be done on the basis of a Eurocentric 
approach. In other words, instead of the 
traditional focus on exporting energy 
from SMCs to Europe, the priority should 
be supporting SMCs in meeting their 
booming energy demand in a sustainable 
way. Cooperation between the EU and 
SMCs in terms of renewable energy 
should be about developing projects for 
the SMCs’ consumption, not for Europe’s. 
Since 2000, energy demand, especially 
electricity demand, has boomed in SMCs 
(Figure 2). This trend is set to continue 
in the future, in response to expected 
population and GDP growth in SMCs.
From an energy cooperation 
perspective, the most sensible way for the 
EU to respond to this challenge is to foster 
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1. In the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy (ENP), 
the category ‘Southern 
Neighbourhood’ includes 
ten partner countries: 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia,  
Libya, Egypt, Israel, Pales-
tinian Territories, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria.
2. For a comprehensive 
overview of the historical 
development of energy 
cooperation in the Medi-
terranean, see Tagliapietra 
(2017).
3. Data from the IRENA data-
base. 
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the large-scale deployment of renewable 
energy – notably solar and wind – in SMCs.
Figure 2: Energy and electricity demand 
in SMCs, % change between 2000 and 
2015
Source: Bruegel based on International Energy Agency, World 
Energy Balances database, accessed in March 2018.
The other important component of 
Euro-Mediterranean regional energy 
cooperation, natural gas, does not need 
EU support in order to progress. It is a 
well-established sector in which progress 
is mainly driven by the private sector. As 
has been shown since 2015 in Egypt with 
the discovery and rapid development 
of the large-scale Zohr natural gas field, 
European energy companies – with the 
diplomatic backup of their respective 
governments – can foster vast projects 
without any EU intervention.
For renewable energy the situation 
is different. The sector is not yet well 
established in the region, increasing 
the financial and regulatory risks for 
European companies. This is the primary 
reason why a strong EU contribution in 
the field could foster progress.
As we will show, making progress on 
renewable energy in the region would 
not only allow SMCs to meet their 
energy demand sustainably – from both 
environmental and macroeconomic 
perspectives – but would also have 
positive benefits for the EU in both 
economic and political terms.
2 CURRENT RENEWABLE ENERGY 
DEVELOPMENTS IN SMCS
The SMCs are richly endowed with solar 
and wind energy resources, which are 
estimated to be among the best in the 
world (IRENA, 2015). Solar photovoltaic 
(PV) potential is widespread in the region 
and can be tapped at both household 
and utility levels. Concentrated solar 
power performs optimally in utility-scale 
projects situated in the region’s deserts, 
where the intensity of solar irradiation 
is among the highest in the world. Wind 
power also has great potential for the 
SMCs, given the favourable wind condi-
tions that characterise all these countries.
In recent years, the SMCs have started 
to exploit this potential. Between 2010 
and 2015, they expanded their installed 
wind capacity from 857 megawatt (MW) 
to 1,942 MW, and their installed solar 
capacity from 74 MW to 382 MW. The 
greatest share of this increase came from 
Morocco, which increased over the same 
period its installed wind capacity from 
253 MW to 934 MW, and its installed 
solar capacity from 34 MW to 200 MW3.
Notwithstanding this progress, wind 
and solar were still a minor contributor 
to SMCs’ primary energy mixes in 2015, 
with shares of 0.01 percent in Algeria, 
0.17 percent in Egypt, 2 percent in Jordan, 
0.3 percent in Lebanon, 1.1 percent in 
Morocco and 0.8 percent in Tunisia 
(Figure 3).
Figure 3: Primary energy mix in SMCs, 
2015
Source: Bruegel based on International Energy Agency database, 
accessed in March 2018.
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Table 1: SMC Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement
Unconditional emissions 
reduction targets
Conditional emissions 
reduction targets
Renewable energy 
implementation measures
Algeria 7% by 2030 compared to BAU 22% by 2030 compared 
to BAU
27% of electricity production 
by 2030
Egypt No specific target determined No specific target 
determined
Not determined
(National strategy 20% of 
electricity production by 2022)
Jordan 1.5% by 2030 compared to BAU 14% by 2030 compared 
to BAU
Not determined
(National strategy 10% of energy 
mix by 2020)
Lebanon 
Not ratified
15% by 2030 compared to BAU 30% by 2030 compared 
to BAU
15-20% of electricity production 
by 2030
Morocco 17% by 2030 compared to BAU 42% by 2030 compared 
to BAU
52% of installed electricity 
production capacity by 2030
Tunisia 13% by 2030 compared to 2010 41% by 2030 compared 
to 2010
30% of electricity production 
by 2030
Source: Bruegel based on International Panel on Climate Change. Note: BAU = business as usual.
3 FUTURE PROSPECTS, IN LIGHT OF 
THE PARIS AGREEMENT 
In the context of the 2015 Paris Agreement 
on combating climate change, all SMCs 
have adopted post-2020 plans, known 
as Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs), to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions. With the exception of Egypt, 
all SMCs have outlined clear 2030 emis-
sion reduction targets. Algeria, Lebanon, 
Morocco and Tunisia also included in their 
NDCs specific targets for the deployment of 
renewable energy, while Egypt and Jordan 
adopted similar targets through national 
energy strategies (Table 1).
These countries’ NDCs differ 
considerably in terms of their levels of 
ambition, but they do share a common 
feature: linking action to external support. 
The SMCs have committed to only modest 
greenhouse gas reductions through their 
own efforts and have promised much more 
substantial action only if external technical 
and financial support is made available4.
International climate finance thus 
has a crucial role to play in fostering the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement 
in the SMCs and, consequently, in 
fostering the large-scale deployment of 
renewable energy.
Figure 4: European and international flows of climate finance to SMCs, by provider 
(2000-2016)
Source: Bruegel based on OECD DAC database, accessed in March 2018.
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4. Conditionality in relation 
to climate goals is not just 
an SMC-specific issue, 
but a broader issue for 
all developing countries. 
About 78 percent of NDCs 
contained within the Paris 
Agreement include con-
ditions. Of these, over 80 
percent are attached to the 
provision of external finan-
cial support for all or part 
of the proposed measures 
(Day et al, 2016).
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Figure 5: European and international flows of energy-related climate finance to SMCs 
(2000-16)
Source: Bruegel based on OECD DAC database, accessed in March 2018.  
*Note: given the lack of data on EIB energy-related climate finance in the DAC database, the EIB’s contribution is here proxied by reporting the 
energy investments carried out by EIB’s Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment Partnership (FEMIP), as per related annual reports.
4 FLOWS OF EUROPEAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE FINANCE 
TO SMCS
Under the Paris Agreement, developed 
countries committed to mobilise from var-
ious sources – public and private, bilateral 
and multilateral – $100 billion per year by 
2025 to support developing countries in 
their efforts to reduce emissions. With a 
contribution of €20.2 billion in 20165, the 
EU is the world’s largest contributor of 
climate finance to developing countries.
In recent years, SMCs have received 
increasing flows of European and 
international climate finance (Figure 4). 
Between 2013 and 2016, Germany was 
the top contributor with a cumulative 
investment of $2.8 billion, followed by 
the World Bank Group ($2.4 billion), 
France ($2 billion), the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD, $1.8 billion), Japan ($1.7 billion), 
the European Investment Bank (EIB, $1.2 
billion) and other EU institutions ($0.5 
billion).
Over the same period, Morocco was the 
main recipient of these flows ($5.4 billion), 
followed by Egypt ($4.6 billion), Jordan 
($2.39 billion) and Tunisia ($1.5 billion).
In terms of the energy component of 
these flows of finance, the EIB played a 
leading role between 2013 and 2016, with 
a cumulative investment of $2.1 billion. 
This was followed by Germany ($1.4 
billion), Japan ($1 billion), the World 
Bank Group ($0.9 billion) and the EBRD 
($0.6 billion) (Figure 5).
Of the 2016 energy-related climate-
finance flows to SMCs, 53 percent was 
devoted to renewable energy generation, 
30 percent to non-renewable energy 
generation, 15 percent to energy 
distribution and 2 percent to energy-
policy related activities.
In absolute terms, SMCs received $0.8 
billion of European and international 
climate finance to support renewable 
energy projects in 2016. This figure, 
amounting to 0.8 percent of the annual 
climate finance commitment pledged 
by developed countries under the Paris 
Agreement, could be scaled-up in the 
future, notably on the basis of a stronger 
European commitment to the region.
More robust European action to foster 
the development of renewable energy in 
SMCs via climate finance should, however, 
be linked to the implementation of certain 
energy reforms in SMCs. These would 
be directed at removing the key barriers 
to the private sector’s engagement in 
renewable energy in these countries.
5 LINKING CLIMATE FINANCE TO 
BETTER RENEWABLE ENERGY 
GOVERNANCE
Scaling-up renewable energy in the SMCs 
in line with the countries’ NDCs will 
be costly. For instance, the World Bank 
Group estimates that Egypt, Jordan and 
Morocco alone would need around $100 
billion in investment in renewable energy 
generation between 2016 and 2030 to 
meet their NDC targets (IFC, 2017).
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International private investment is 
essential to meet this large investment 
need. However, various barriers in SMCs 
continue to prevent international investors 
from becoming more engaged in SMC 
renewable energy sectors (RES4MED, 
2017). Two key barriers stand out:
• Legal and regulatory barriers: All 
SMCs have renewable energy targets, 
but achieving them ultimately relies 
on the presence of sound and stable 
renewable energy regulatory frame-
works. On this front, much remains 
to be done in the SMCs. Jordan is the 
only SMC with a well-established and 
reliable renewable energy regulatory 
framework, while in other countries 
the situation is more complex. For 
instance, frequent changes in feed-
in-tariff schemes and fossil-fuel 
subsidies are a concern for investors 
in Egypt, while the lack of an inde-
pendent regulatory authority is a key 
concern for investors in Morocco. 
The lack of a fully developed regula-
tory framework continues to hinder 
investments in Algeria, Lebanon and 
Tunisia.
• Financial barriers: Currency convert-
ibility, inflation and lack of foreign 
reserves are concerns for investors in 
almost all SMCs. The cost of financing 
and the limited availability of debt 
from commercial sources for renewa-
ble projects represent a general chal-
lenge in all SMCs, though to different 
degrees. These barriers are felt either 
through non-availability of finance or 
inflexible grace periods that are not 
adapted to the characteristics of such 
investments.
BOX 1: The role of climate finance in reducing the cost of capital for renewable energy in SMCs
Over the last decade, wind and solar power have become mainstream technologies thanks 
to substantial declines in their costs. Since 2009, solar photovoltaic costs have dropped by 
80 percent and this trend is continuing. Wind turbine costs have halved in the same period. 
In 2017, the cost of electricity generation from newly installed wind averaged $0.06 per 
kilowatt-hour (kWh) worldwide.
The cost structure of electricity generation from renewable energy technologies differs 
from thermal power generation since renewables do not use any fuels. Most of the gener-
ation cost relates to the capital cost of technologies. Financing costs, therefore, are key to 
ensuring cost-competitiveness. Capital costs include the costs of debt and equity, and are 
affected by country- and industry-specific risks. For instance, the cost of capital for renew-
able energy investments in Europe ranges from 3.5 percent in Germany to 12 percent in 
Greece for onshore wind (DiaCore, 2016). This wide range is a consequence of the different 
policy risks that investors face (for example, differences in the national regulatory frame-
works that support the deployment of renewable energy sources).
An enabling investment environment boosted by low financing costs is fundamental 
to create markets for renewable energy technologies. This is where climate finance comes 
into play. In SMCs, renewable energy is financed from various sources. One form is funding 
made available by private investors, along with land ownership. This comes with minor 
risks as funds are readily available. Commonly, local banks and international finance insti-
tutions (IFIs) provide loans to investors in renewable energy. For these loans, the interest 
rate, which would determine to a great extent the cost of capital, could depend on factors 
including loan type, the currency of the loan and funding source. For instance, an issue for 
SMCs in particular is that interest rates for local currency are much higher than 10 percent 
currently. On the other hand, foreign exchange loans in euros or US dollars from IFIs such 
as the EBRD and the EIB could offer investors more favourable financing costs. Greater 
engagement of these institutions and other climate finance vehicles could leverage addi-
tional financing, in particular from the private sector, because the IFIs’ risk-mitigation and 
credit-enhancement tools would reduce the risks for private investors.
5.  This includes contributions 
from the EU’s own budget, 
from EU member states 
and from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB).
6.  See: https://ec.europa.eu/
neighbourhood-enlarge-
ment/neighbourhood/
overview_en.
7.  For country-specific lists 
of possible pragmatic solu-
tions, see RES4MED (2017).
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SMCs must take action to overcome 
these barriers, in line with their respective 
national circumstances. That is, the 
governments of SMCs should act first and 
reform their energy sectors in order to 
unleash private investment.
Europe meanwhile could incentivise 
this process by offering individual countries 
more ambitious climate financing, aimed 
at cutting the cost of capital for renewable 
energy projects and leveraging more 
private investment (Box 1).
But such action should be conditional 
on the implementation of the reforms 
necessary to attract further private 
investment. To be clear, these reforms 
should not be aimed at replicating in the 
SMCs the European frameworks and rules. 
The EU has traditionally had a tendency to 
promote in its neighbourhood the take-up 
of EU energy policy principles, such as 
liberalisation.
This copy-and-paste approach clearly 
emerges from the Action Plans that form 
the backbone of the EU Neighbourhood 
Policy6. These plans foresee gradual 
convergence of SMCs towards 
European rules. In 2003, for example, 
a ‘Memorandum of Understanding for 
the progressive integration of electricity 
markets of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
and in the EU electricity internal market’ 
was signed. The creation of Mediterranean 
associations of regulators and transmission 
system operators in 2007 and 2012 also 
somewhat followed the blueprint of EU 
internal market integration.
Recent history has shown that, 
apart from sharing best practices, the 
effectiveness of these initiatives has been 
limited. The Eurocentric approach to 
energy cooperation in the Mediterranean 
should therefore be changed. Instead 
of seeking to promote energy market 
liberalisation in SMCs, Europe should 
work with individual SMCs to formulate 
pragmatic solutions to specific legal, 
regulatory and financial bottlenecks.
In the legal and regulatory areas, 
concrete solutions to be promoted in 
specific SMCs might include measures 
to increase clarity and transparency of 
rules; to provide legal and administrative 
support to international energy companies 
willing to invest in the country; to enhance 
transparency and clarity of rules in 
dispute procedures and to shorten dispute 
resolution timeframes; to phase-out fossil 
fuel subsidies; to establish one-stop-shops 
for renewable energy permits. 
In terms of financing, concrete solutions 
to be promoted in specific SMCs might 
include measures to enhance local banks’ 
capacities and ranges of instruments 
for supporting international investors; 
to establish a more stable central-bank 
monetary policy; to encourage transactions 
and power-purchase agreements with 
a more stable currency; to establish 
favourable tax regimes for renewables7.
Greater climate finance support should 
only be offered to SMCs that implement 
such solutions in practice.
6 THE POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS 
FOR EUROPE
Providing support so that SMCs can meet 
their energy demands in a sustainable 
way would benefit not only the SMCs 
themselves, but also Europe. Supporting 
sustainable energy development in SMCs 
would imply:
1. Opening up new business opportunities 
for European energy companies to 
operate in rapidly growing markets;
2. Promoting the export of European 
renewable energy technologies. This 
is notably the case for wind power, 
a sector in which SMCs rely almost 
exclusively on imported European 
technology (Figure 6);
3. Guaranteeing the stability of future 
gas exports from the region to Europe, 
by allowing these countries to meet 
their growing electricity demand with 
renewables instead of gas. This is 
important for Europe because these gas 
exports are an important element of the 
EU’s gas security-of-supply architecture;
4. Promoting more rapid economic 
development in SMCs, which is a key 
prerequisite for expanding the region’s 
economic and trade relations with Europe;
5. Making a significant contribution to 
global emissions mitigation efforts by 
promoting the development of cleaner 
energy systems in SMCs, in line with the 
Paris Agreement.
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Figure 6: SMCs’ import of wind and solar technologies by source (€ millions)
Source: Bruegel based on Comtrade.
In order to have an impact, energy 
cooperation between the EU and SMCs 
should shift its focus from the export of 
energy from SMCs to Europe, to Europe 
supporting SMCs in meeting their 
booming energy demand in a sustainable 
way. 
Europe could scale-up its climate 
financing activity in SMCs to support 
these countries in meeting their Paris 
Agreement pledges. But greater support 
should be linked to the implementation 
of energy reforms in SMCs, aimed at 
removing the barriers to the private 
sector’s engagement in their renewable 
energy sectors. This could be done by 
promoting pragmatic solutions to specific 
legal, regulatory and financial bottlenecks 
in individual SMCs. Higher levels of 
climate finance should be offered only 
to SMCs that actually implement such 
solutions. Supporting SMCs in meeting 
their energy needs in a sustainable 
way would also benefit Europe both in 
economic and political terms.
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